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It also acts as a costly screen, discouraging applicants from seeking low-value patents.
Yet despite these dual roles, the patent system has a substantial quality problem: it is
both too easy to get a patent (because examiners grant invalid patents that should be
filtered out by a substantive screen) and too cheap to do so (because examiners grant
low-value nuisance patents that should be filtered out by a costly screen).
This Article argues that these flaws in patent screening are both worse and better
than has been recognized. The flaws are worse because they are not static, but
dynamic, interacting to reinforce each other. This interaction leads to a vicious cycle
of more and more patents that should never have been granted. When patents are too
easily obtained, that undermines the costly screen, because even a plainly invalid
patent has a nuisance value greater than its cost. And when patents are too cheaply
obtained, that undermines the substantive screen, because there will be more patent
applications, and the examination system cannot scale indefinitely without sacrificing
accuracy. The result is a cycle of more and more applications, being screened less and
less accurately, to give more and more low-quality patents. And although it is hard
to test directly if the quality of patent examination is falling, there is evidence
suggesting that this cycle is affecting the patent system.
At the same time, these flaws are not as bad as they seem because this cycle may
be surprisingly easy to solve. The cycle gives policymakers substantial flexibility in
designing patent reforms, because the effect of a reform on one piece of the cycle will
propagate to the rest of the cycle. Reformers can concentrate on the easiest places to
make reforms (like the litigation system) instead of trying to do the impossible (like
eliminating examination errors). Such reforms would not only have local effects, but
could help make the entire patent system work better.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement is a strange legal claim. In most lawsuits, events follow
a standard script: first the plaintiff ’s claim accrues, then the plaintiff files suit,
and finally the plaintiff must prove each element of the claim. In a negligence
case, for instance, only as the lawsuit proceeds does the plaintiff have to prove
that the defendant owed a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty,
and that the breach caused damage.
In a patent case, this usual sequence is set aside. A key component of the
claim—that the patentee invented something that is legally entitled to
protection—is not proved at trial.1 Instead, years or even decades before, a
patent applicant persuades a patent examiner that she is entitled to a patent.2
And the examiner’s decision to grant a patent is entitled to significant
deference at trial, even though there are many reasons to think examiners are
not particularly good at deciding whether an applicant has really invented
anything.3 It is as if the existence of a duty of care were not decided in a
lawsuit, but years before, when the plaintiff asserted that a duty existed in an
ex parte filing with a bureaucrat, with the party owing the duty not necessarily
knowing of the proceeding until years later.
Why patent law uses this examination model, and whether it should do
so, are fundamental questions in the field. Scholars have advanced two
principal explanations for patent law’s use of examination. The first is that
examiners function as a substantive screen.4 This substantive screen performs

1 Under the Patent Act, a patent is presumed valid, 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012), though invalidity
can be asserted as an affirmative defense to infringement, id. § 282(b).
2 Id. § 131.
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495
& n.1 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (citing many articles criticizing the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) for doing a poor job examining patents).
4 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 706 (9th ed., rev. 2015) [hereinafter
MPEP] (“[T]he patent application should be reviewed and analyzed . . . to determine whether the

830

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 827

several functions. It separates deserving and undeserving applications for
patent rights, protecting patent quality by ensuring that patent rights are
assigned to the people who actually invented things and strengthening
incentives to invent and file for patents.5 It also helps improve the patents
that are granted, since examiners review applications to make sure inventors
have properly disclosed their inventions.6 And it helps to clarify and provide
notice of rights from the start, so inventors can invest in developing their
products and the public can avoid infringing others’ rights.
The second explanation for patent law’s use of examination does not
depend on examiners performing a substantive service. Instead, it posits that
simply by making it more expensive to obtain patent rights, examination
serves as a costly screen, discouraging applicants from seeking low-value
patents.7 If it costs $30,000 to obtain a patent, then a rational actor will only
apply for one if she expects to obtain at least $30,000 in benefits from having
the patent. And since patent law theoretically allows a patent holder to
capture privately much of the social value of an invention, at least for the
duration of the patent term,8 the low-private-value patents that get screened
out are also likely to be low-social-value patents that we want to exclude.
Neither of these explanations for patent law’s examination model is
entirely persuasive. The substantive-screen theory only works if examination
provides the claimed benefits—if examiners grant patents to the right
applicants, and if those grants are reliably enforceable in court. Yet most
patent scholars agree that patents have a substantial quality problem, so that
many granted patents are invalid.9 Moreover, courts often invalidate these
patents when they are litigated—probably not as often as they should,10 but
often enough to create uncertainty for patent holders and the public. Indeed,

claims define a useful, novel, nonobvious, and enabled invention . . . . The goal of examination is to
clearly articulate any rejection . . . .”).
5 A high-quality patent is one that satisfies the statutory rules for patentability, and so awards
exclusive rights to an inventor who has invented something novel, nonobvious, and otherwise
patentable. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2138 (2009) (identifying “high-quality” patents as those meeting “statutory standards of patentability”).
6 See MPEP, supra note 4, §§ 2163–2164 (requiring applicants to fulfill the written description
and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112).
7 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687,
699 (2010) (“The administrative expense involved in obtaining a patent functions as a costly screen
against low-value property rights.”).
8 See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 525, 529-30 (2001) (explaining the patentee’s ability to capture monopoly profits during
the patent term).
9 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
10 See generally Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
71 (2013) (describing invalidity proceedings and arguing that structural flaws in the patent system
lead courts to decide too many cases on grounds other than validity).
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there are reasons to think that patent examiners are simply incapable of
systematically separating deserving and undeserving patent applications, or
at least that it would be prohibitively expensive to do so.11
The costly-screen theory may provide a better approach, since it does not
depend on a level of examination accuracy that might be impossible to
achieve. The problem is that the theory does not explain much of the behavior
we observe in the real world. The theory predicts that the cost of prosecuting
a patent application will screen out the sort of low-value patents that make
up the “patent thicket”12 or are only asserted in nuisance lawsuits.13 Yet stories
of such patents are legion; indeed, many or even most patent cases are precisely
the sort of nuisance lawsuits a costly screen might prevent.14 So if patent
examination acts as a costly screen, it is not an especially effective one. Moreover,
if the main benefit of patent examination stems from the cost it imposes on
applicants, then much of the work of patent lawyers and examiners is wasted;
the same ends could be accomplished with far less busywork by moving to a
registration system in which the fee to purchase a patent is $30,000.15
These flaws in the patent system—with patents being both too easy and
too cheap to obtain—are well known.16 And yet, this Article argues, things
are worse than they seem. These flaws in the patent system are not static;
11 See generally Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3 (arguing that because most patents are
never litigated or licensed, it would be wasteful to invest too many resources in patent examination);
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 588-606 (1999) (assessing the appropriate
“error rate” for patent applications).
12 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting
(describing the danger that the patent system might “impos[e] an unnecessary drag on innovation
by enabling multiple rights owners to ‘tax’ new products, processes, and even business methods”),
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
13 See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677,
696-700 (2012) (explaining that when patents cost more to file than the value that can be obtained
by asserting them in nuisance suits or as part of a patent thicket, the costly screen acts to prevent
them from being filed in the first place).
14 For instance, a study by RPX—a “defensive patent aggregator” that buys up patents that
might be asserted against its members—found that of 3278 patent lawsuits that ended in 2013 and
were brought by nonpracticing entities, 52% ended within six months of filing. RPX CORP., 2013
NPE LITIGATION REPORT 37 chart 55 (2014), http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
01/RPX-2013-NPE-Litigation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7H-YU22] [hereinafter RPX, 2013
LITIGATION REPORT]. And in an RPX study of 900 settlements, legal costs exceeded settlement
payments in all but the most expensive cases. RPX CORP., 2012 NPE COST STUDY: HIGH-LEVEL
FINDINGS 9 chart 2 (2013), http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/RPX%E2%80%99sNPE-Cost-Study-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXS6-59WS]. These findings suggest that many of
these cases are exactly the sort of nuisance lawsuits that settle to avoid the cost of litigation, rather
than because the claim is meritorious.
15 See, e.g., Fagundes & Masur, supra note 13, at 682 n.12 (noting that cost screens are agnostic
to the method of achieving the screen, and simply represent transaction costs); see also infra notes
50–53 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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instead, they interact and reinforce each other. This Article explores that
interaction, which the legal literature has not previously recognized. This
interaction creates what I call the patent spiral: a vicious cycle of worse and
worse patent examination, leading to more and more low-quality patents,
which in turn leads to worse and worse examination. In short, we should
expect the patent system’s flaws to get worse over time.
This effect has different causes in each half of the cycle. A flawed substantive
screen weakens the costly screen because it results in more invalid patents:
when it is too easy to obtain a patent, examiners will grant many invalid patents.
These invalid patents are, however, usually worth more than the cost of
obtaining them, thanks to the cost of patent litigation, the presumption of
validity, and various other factors that lead parties to settle nuisance cases. If
it costs $30,000 to obtain a patent, but even a plainly invalid patent has a
nuisance value of $150,000, then the costly screen does not work. So the costly
screen becomes less effective at discouraging patent applicants from applying
for low-value patents.
And in turn, the flawed costly screen undermines the substantive screen—
it makes the PTO worse at its job—because it results in more patent
applications of all kinds. When it is too cheap to obtain a patent and the PTO
gets applications even for patents of low social value, the substantive screen
fails to do its job. The PTO, like any large bureaucracy, cannot scale indefinitely:
as the number of patent applications increases, the cost of examination will
increase, or the quality of examination will decline, or both. This is so because
three types of costs increase with the number of applications and examiners.
Personnel costs increase because hiring and search costs grow nonlinearly; the
first 4000 patent examiners will be better at their jobs than the second 4000
examiners, unless the PTO pays more to find the second group. Coordination
costs increase because it is harder to maintain consistency while keeping
examiners’ knowledge and procedures up to date when there are more examiners.
And search costs increase because more prior art makes it harder to determine
if an application claims a patentable invention. Since patents are the main
source of prior art used by examiners,17 it becomes harder to examine patent
applications as the number of patents increases. So the inadequate costly screen,
which increases the number of patent applications, will also weaken the
substantive screen.

17 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations
Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 846 (2013) (reviewing a random sample of patents issued in 2007 and
reporting that nearly 91% of prior-art references cited by examiners were U.S. patents or U.S. patent
applications); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 318 (noting “reports that the Patent Office has increasingly relied
upon previously issued patents as prior art”).
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The good news is that this vicious cycle gives policymakers substantial
flexibility in designing patent reforms because the effect of a reform on one piece
of the cycle will propagate to the rest of the cycle. Reforms can be targeted at
several distinct places in the cycle: at improving either the substantive screen or
costly screen, or at disrupting the links between the two roles. Any or all of these
reforms could have beneficial effects throughout the patent system. A reform that
improved the substantive screen, for instance, would result in fewer invalid patents,
and thus make it less lucrative for an applicant to apply for such a patent, thereby
making the costly screen more effective. Or a reform that improved the costly
screen would discourage applicants from seeking more low-value patents,
reducing the number of patent applications and making it easier for the PTO
to improve the substantive screen. Likewise, simple reforms like eliminating the
presumption of validity or reducing the cost of discovery in patent cases would
reduce the value of invalid patents, making the costly screen more effective (and
then, in turn, improving the substantive screen). Solving some of the patent
system’s biggest problems, in other words, may be easier than it seems.
This Article has four parts. Part I provides background, describing the
substantive- and costly-screen roles of patent examination. Part II explores
the interaction of these two roles and argues that they lead to a vicious cycle
of worse and worse patent examination. Part III reviews some empirical evidence
suggesting that this cycle exists within the modern patent system. Part IV
discusses the implications of the vicious cycle for patent policy and patent reform.
I. PATENT LAW’S EXAMINATION MODEL
A patent permits an inventor to prevent others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing an invention.18 Unlike in many areas of the law,
though, it is not the underlying act of inventing something new that gives a
plaintiff the power to bring an enforcement action. Instead, patent law follows
an examination model: the inventor must first convince a patent examiner
that she invented something new.19 In this process, an examiner reviews an
inventor’s patent application, which describes the scope of the invention and
the inventor’s claimed exclusive rights, and searches the prior art to see if the

18 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). As is usual in the
literature, this Article focuses on utility patents, not design or plant patents, though many of the
arguments could extend to those areas. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (plant patents); id. § 171 (design patents).
19 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (describing the requirements to apply for a patent); id. § 131
(requiring the PTO to examine applications for patentability and to issue a patent when an applicant
is so entitled).
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claimed invention meets the patentability requirements.20 If the examiner
does not find any disqualifying prior art, she will grant the patent.21
There is nothing inevitable about this examination model; it is an outlier
even among forms of intellectual property.22 For instance, some types of
intellectual property use a registration model, with rights vesting, or becoming
enforceable, only after a rights holder registers a claim with the federal
government. In this model, these claims do not go through any substantive
examination, and a plaintiff has to prove her entitlement when enforcing those
rights. In copyright law, for instance, an author is entitled to a copyright the
moment she creates an “original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression,”23 but the copyright holder cannot generally enforce
those rights until a copyrighted work has been registered with the Copyright
Office of the Library of Congress.24 That registration, however, is largely a
formality; the Copyright Office does not examine applications to determine
if an author really wrote a work or if the work is too similar to another
registered work.25 Similarly, copyright-like protections for mask works (the

20 Prior art consists of similar inventions that came before the claimed invention, usually in
the form of prior patents, printed publications, and commercial products. See generally id. § 102
(listing prior art that can deprive an invention of novelty); id. § 103 (stating that prior art may render
an invention obvious); MPEP, supra note 4, ch. 900 (providing the examination procedures involving
“Prior Art, Classification, and Search”).
21 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Trademark law also follows an examination model, at least with respect
to federally registered trademarks. Before granting registration of such a mark, a trademark examiner
searches existing trademarks to determine if any conflict with the applicant’s proposed registration.
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (describing the application process); id. § 1052 (describing grounds
on which an examiner can deny registration); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 704
(8th ed. 2015) (describing the initial examination of a trademark application).
22 And even U.S. patent law did not always use the examination model. Before the Patent Act
of 1836 set up the modern examination system, most patents were issued without substantive
examination. See Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2012) (noting
that before 1836, except for three years in the 1790s, the patent statute forbade substantive review);
see also Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 131) (requiring
the Commissioner of Patents to provide for examination of patent applications).
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see also id. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”).
24 See id. § 411 (providing, with limited exceptions, that “no civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with [the Copyright Act]”); see also id. § 408 (describing the
copyright registration system).
25 Specifically, the Register of Copyrights must determine that the work “constitutes copyrightable
subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements of [the Copyright Act] have been
met.” Id. § 410(a). This review, however, is largely perfunctory. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Register’s decision of whether or not
to grant a registration certificate is largely perfunctory, and is ultimately reviewable by the courts.”).
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three-dimensional patterns that define a semiconductor chip) and boat hulls
use a registration model.26
Other types of intellectual property use a decentralized or automatic-vesting
model, in which intellectual property rights come into existence, and can be
enforced, without any registration or examination by a government official.
Trade-secret protection, for instance, generally applies to confidential information
that derives its economic value from that confidentiality; if a third party
misappropriates that information, the third party can be held liable even though
there is no centralized registration or examination of potential trade secrets.27
Similarly, rights of publicity arise without examination or registration.28 And
although trademark holders gain specific benefits from registering their marks,
basic trademark rights under both federal law and most states’ laws are based
on use, not examination or registration.29
So why does patent law use the examination model? There are two major
explanations, one based on the substance of what examiners do and the other
based on the costs examination imposes. But as discussed below, neither
explanation is entirely persuasive.
A. Examination as a Substantive Screen
The most common explanation for patent law’s examination model is that
examiners act as a substantive screen, which improves patent quality and
benefits both patent holders and the public. These benefits come in two forms.
First, and most obviously, examiners strive to grant worthy patent
applications—applications that claim inventions that are novel, nonobvious,
and otherwise patentable—and reject unworthy ones. This is the role most
people imagine when they think of patent examiners. If an examiner uncovers
prior art that demonstrates that a claimed invention was not novel, or would
26 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (protection for mask works); id. §§ 1301–1332 (protection for designs,
specifically including designs for vessel hulls).
27 See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). Forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Act, albeit with significant changes in
some states. Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret
Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 178 & n.23 (2014). Federal
law also provides limited protection for trade secrets. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012) (providing criminal
penalties for theft of trade secrets).
28 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2015) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising . . . without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”).
29 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing liability for the use of a mark in a manner that
is likely to cause consumer confusion, regardless of registration); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION ch. 22 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing state
trademark protections).
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have been obvious to someone skilled in the art, then the patent examiner
should refuse to grant a patent.30 This, the theory goes, prevents a patent
applicant from claiming a monopoly when she did not contribute anything
meaningful to the world, protecting the public from spurious patent claims.31
It also reduces the uncertainty in the value of a granted patent, since a patent
that has made it through examination is more likely to survive in court.32 This
makes it easier and less risky to invest in developing commercial products
based on patented technology.33
Second, patent examiners also help improve the quality of individual
patents, even when those patents would have issued under either system.
Besides looking at whether a patent claim is novel and nonobvious, examiners
also enforce a series of doctrines that aims to ensure an invention is fully and
clearly disclosed to the public.34 As the Federal Circuit observed, “An essential
purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear,
correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be
removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.”35 Examination
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Similarly, patent examiners ensure that applicants seek patents claiming patentable subject
matter, rather than inventions that are overly conceptual or abstract. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining
patentable subject matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-13 (2010)
(evaluating the scope of § 101); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980) (same); Ford,
supra note 10, at 80-81 (discussing the patentable-subject-matter requirement); Katherine J. Strandburg,
Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 567-68 (2012) (observing that rhetoric
surrounding the patentable-subject-matter doctrine suggests that patent law seeks to exclude overly
conceptual or abstract ideas in order to avoid preempting subsequent ideas). The vast majority of
patents undoubtedly claim patentable subject matter, however, and the ones on the outer edge depend on
uncertain questions of law—like what sorts of software are patentable—rather than any uncertainty
in the patent itself. Accordingly, we should expect examiners to play a relatively unimportant role
in enforcing the patentable-subject-matter requirement.
32 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 49 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890) (lamenting that, before patents went through examination,
“[a] patentee receiving his grant entirely at his own risk of its subsequent defeat by the proof of any
use or knowledge of the invention prior to his own, and yet having no method of ascertaining whether
such use existed, except the tedious, expensive, and uncertain one of private inquiry,” received a
patent that “was necessarily of small commercial value”).
33 See id. § 50 (noting how establishment of the patent examination regime increased investor
security). This point builds on the prospect theory of patents, which asserts that patents provide an
incentive to develop new technologies while avoiding wasteful duplication of effort. See John F.
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2004) (describing “prospect”
patents as those “issued in the very early stages of technical development”); Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265-66 (1977) (proposing a prospect
theory whereby innovators use patents to secure “particular opportunit[ies] to develop . . . known
technological possibilit[ies]”). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (criticizing ex post justifications for patents).
34 Specifically, examiners enforce the written-description, enablement, best-mode, and definiteness
requirements. Ford, supra note 10, at 79-80.
35 In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
30
31
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can have this effect because applicants know in advance that an examiner will
review an application for compliance with these doctrines, giving applicants
incentives to provide clear disclosures, and because the examination process often
turns into a negotiation between the applicant and the examiner, which refines
the patent.36
The substantive explanation almost certainly has some merit; patent
examiners reject many patent applications,37 and it would be shocking if an
agency that employs more than 8000 patent examiners were, effectively,
throwing darts.38 At the same time, most patent scholars agree that there is a
patent-quality problem.39 It is hard to know the full scope of this problem, since
most patents are never litigated or otherwise contested.40 But the empirical
evidence shows clearly that examiners grant many invalid patents and grant
many patents with vague claims. For one thing, nearly half of litigated patents

36 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2009) (describing the prosecution process as a “negotiat[ion
with the examiner] over the scope of the invention”); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining
Patent Examination, STAN. TECH. L. REV., May 2010, ¶¶ 6–18 (comparing patent allowance rates at
various stages of patent prosecution); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 119, 140 (1991) (“Inventors haggle with the patent examiner . . . .”).
37 It is, however, surprisingly difficult to know exactly how many applications are rejected.
Estimates of the PTO’s grant rate come as low as 39% and as high as 97%. See Mark A. Lemley &
Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 183-85 (2008) (identifying
uncertainties in determining the PTO’s allowance rate and listing possible estimates).
38 As of November 2015, the PTO employed 8199 patent examiners. Patent Examiners on Staff, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?
CTNAVID=1005 [https://perma.cc/9GZB-4X4E] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
39 For just a few of the many arguments to that effect, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS
AT RISK 54-62 (2008) (arguing that patents fail to clearly demarcate patentees’ rights); ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 34
(2004) (“[T]he granting of patents despite clear evidence of invalidity, in the form of prior art that
makes the invention not novel and/or obvious, has become all too common.”); Joseph Farrell &
Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent
Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 94446 (2004) (citing “inadequate resources,” “biased procedures,” and “skewed incentives” as reasons
for erroneous patent grants); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1495-97 (describing criticism
of the PTO for “allowing bad patents to slip through the system”); Merges, supra note 11, at 589-91
(noting that a high error rate is likely in the software area and has only been worsened by the increase
in applications); Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 736
(2012) (“The patent system makes many mistakes, frequently granting patents that should be denied
and denying many patents that should be granted.”); Wagner, supra note 5, at 2139-45 (discussing
several reasons to be concerned about a low-quality patent system). For a useful overview of the
concept of patent quality, see Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3091, 3109-16 (2014).
40 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1501-03 (“Only about one hundred [patent]
cases per year (and 125 patents) actually make it to trial.”).
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that make it to a final judgment are invalidated.41 At the same time, the number
of utility patents granted annually has tripled over the last few decades, even
adjusting for population growth and the increasingly global patent system.42 Yet
there is little reason to think that the world has become three times as innovative
in that time.43 Instead, the likelier explanation is that rent seekers who have
invented little or nothing are seeking more and more patents, and that the PTO
is willing to grant many of those patents.
The structure of the examination system exacerbates the problem.
Examiners face an asymmetric burden: under federal law, they may grant a
patent application, without explanation, or issue an office action explaining
why the applicant is not entitled to a patent.44 So rejecting a patent application
takes more work than granting it.45 And such a rejection is effectively never
final; applicants may respond to each denial—albeit while sometimes paying
additional fees—until the examiner gives in and grants a patent.46 Examiners,
however, have every incentive to get files off their desks: examiners’ bonus pay
is tied to the number of applications they finish processing, and—since a rejection
usually leads to more work—effectively to the number of patents they grant.47
Examiners are also poorly equipped to do a good job; they spend just eighteen
hours on the average patent, and have limited ability to search nonpatent prior

41 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-07 (1998). It is hard to know what to make of this statistic. Patent holders have
a choice of patents to litigate, and are likely to choose the strongest ones, so in considering the
universe of all patents, the invalidity problem may be worse than this statistic indicates. At the same
time, it might simply be a reflection of the Priest–Klein hypothesis, since cases in which the parties
are likely to be able to predict the outcome are most likely to settle. See George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-2 (1984) (observing that litigation
outcomes are at best a poor predictor of overall trends in legal disputes, since most disputes are
settled in the shadow of governing legal rules).
42 See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
43 Cf. Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1661, 1673-78 (1990) (reviewing studies finding weak relationships between patenting and research
and development activity).
44 Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1496 n.3; see also D. Christopher Ohly, Trevor
Joike, Kelly L. Morron & Melvin Robinson, It Is Not So Obvious: The Impact of KSR on Patent
Prosecution, Licensing, and Litigation, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 282-84 (2008) (describing the burden on
patent examiners to justify rejections for failure to meet the nonobviousness requirement).
45 Cf. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data,
98 REV. ECON. STAT. (forthcoming 2016) (finding that when patent examiners are promoted,
leaving them less time for patent examination, they become more likely to grant patent applications).
46 See MPEP, supra note 4, § 706.07(h) (“An applicant may obtain continued examination of
an application [after a final action] by filing a [request for continued examination] . . . .”).
47 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING
EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 21 (2007)
(“The agency awards bonuses at the end of each fiscal year to patent examiners who exceed their
production goals by at least 10 percent.”).
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art.48 Accordingly, even though the principal purpose of patent examination is
likely to separate deserving and undeserving applications, there are enough
reasons to doubt the effectiveness of this process that one scholar has even
suggested moving to a registration system.49
B. Examination as a Costly Screen
An alternative explanation for patent law’s examination model comes
from costly-screen theory, which asserts that the cost of obtaining a patent
itself plays a valuable role in the patent system, even if examiners contribute
nothing substantively.50 The theory is straightforward. Obtaining a patent is
not free; it can cost $20,000 to $30,000 for a typical patent, in attorney fees,
PTO filing fees, inventors’ time, and delays between invention and patent
issuance.51 A rational patent applicant would apply for a patent only when the
expected private value of doing so exceeds this cost: when she expects to gain
more than $20,000 or $30,000 in royalties, monopoly profits, or other benefits
from having the patent.52 Hypothetical low-private-value patents, then, that
might exist in a world with costless examination would never come into existence
in a world where examination acts as a costly screen.53
The costly-screen justification might seem to select for precisely the wrong
attribute of a patent, since we should care more about the social value of a
patent than its private value. Patents with high private and social values would
come into existence, and those with low private and social values would be
48 See Ford, supra note 10, at 89 (describing time limitations on patent examiners’ abilities to
perform complete examinations).
49 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present PatentObtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 59 (2003) (arguing that a registration system would mitigate the
social costs of a patent system).
50 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 13, at 685-91 (explaining how transaction costs screen out
low-value patents); Masur, supra note 7, at 717 (explaining how a costly screen has no effect on
welfare-enhancing patents).
51 See, e.g., Fagundes & Masur, supra note 13, at 689-90 (“[A]n average patentee will spend
approximately $22,000 to successfully prosecute a patent application.”); Lemley, Rational Ignorance,
supra note 3, at 1498 & n.13 (“[T]he general range of costs for prosecuting a patent from start to
finish . . . appears to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent.”). This estimate will vary, of course, depending
on the industry, importance of the patent application, complexity of the technology, number of
claims in the application, scope of the prior art, and innumerable other factors.
52 These other benefits can include indirect financial benefits, such as signaling innovation to
potential investors. Annamaria Conti, Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, Patents as Signals for Startup
Financing, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 592, 593 (2013). There are also nonfinancial benefits. See, e.g., Jeanne
C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1771-72 (2012) (demonstrating
the psychological value inventors gain from self-expression in their inventions).
53 To simplify this discussion, I will drop “hypothetical” from the description of patents that
might come into existence but for the cost of the screen. To be clear, though, patents with low private
value are those that do not exist, but might in the counterfactual world in which patent examination
were costless for applicants.
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screened out, regardless of this asymmetry. But patents with high social value
and low private value would be screened out—a loss of socially useful
innovation. And patents with low (or negative) social value and high private
value would come into existence despite the screen—also a loss for society,
since these patents would let their holders collect monopoly rents without
contributing anything substantial to society.54
This mismatch between goal (patents with high social value) and method
(selecting for high private value) might not be a problem, though, since there
are reasons to think that patents with asymmetric private and social values
should be relatively rare. Patents with low private value but high social value
should almost never occur, since the patent system is designed precisely to
allow an inventor to capture a large chunk of the value that an invention
creates for society. Any patent, then, that creates substantial social gains will
almost certainly allow the patent holder to capture enough of those gains to
make the patent worthwhile.55 Patents with high private value but low social
value likely do exist; they are the sorts of patents asserted in nuisance lawsuits
and the ones that make up the “patent thicket” of overlapping rights.56 But
the costly screen still reduces the number of such patents that are granted, so
even if it does not filter out all problematic patents, it is still a useful tool to
reduce the problem.
There are three significant objections to the costly-screen explanation for
patent law’s examination model. First, it is wasteful. If the major purpose of
patent examination is to impose costs on applicants, then why do so through
substantive examination? Why not cut out the middleman and just impose a
larger issuance fee? Then, at least, the money could go to something productive
instead of being spent on bureaucratic wrangling. Second, it may have
disproportionate effects on different kinds of patent applicants. Startups and
individual inventors, for instance, are the classic examples of who should expect
to benefit most from the patent system, since they may be more likely to generate
groundbreaking inventions and are less able to rely on competitive advantages
other than patent rights. But these small entities may also be capital-constrained
in a way that big companies are not, and so may be unable to invest in
intellectual property. And third, the costly screen does not seem to be having
the effect it should. Many patent scholars agree that the PTO grants plenty
of low-value nuisance patents and “patent thicket” patents; the cost of obtaining
a patent does not seem to be having a significant deterrent effect on these

54 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 13, at 695-96 (explaining how patents with low social value
and high private value can be used offensively and defensively in ways that harm social welfare).
55 See id. at 700-04 (explaining how patents encourage high-social-value inventions).
56 See id. at 695-96 (highlighting the role of such patents in litigation and licensing).
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patents.57 Indeed, these low-value patents, and the royalties and lawsuits they
prompt, are probably the biggest problem in intellectual property law today—a
problem that may have cost society hundreds of billions of dollars.58
*

*

*

That neither the substantive-screen explanation nor the costly-screen
explanation is foolproof does not mean that patent examination is worthless.
The criticisms may just mean that examination does not provide every benefit
it could. Perhaps examination provides enough total benefits—from both its
role as a substantive screen and its role as a costly screen—to be worthwhile.
Despite its flaws, the costly-screen theory could be a promising complement
to the substantive theory because it identifies a new category of benefits from
patent examination. Those benefits, though, are undermined by the interaction
of the two roles, as discussed in the next Part.
II. PATENT EXAMINATION’S VICIOUS CYCLE
This Part discusses the interaction of patent examination’s roles as a
substantive screen and a costly screen. The basic argument is that these flaws
in patent examination’s two roles reinforce each other, leading to a vicious
cycle of weaker and weaker patent examination.59
The flawed substantive screen weakens the value of examination as a
costly screen because it increases the value of applying for an invalid patent.
Since essentially any patent, valid or not, can be worth more than the cost to
obtain it, thanks to doctrines like the presumption of validity and factors like
the cost of patent litigation,60 examination ends up deterring fewer and fewer
patent applications, reducing the effectiveness of the costly screen. The main
driver of a potential applicant’s decisionmaking, then, is whether an examiner is
likely to grant some patent. And the weakened costly screen, in turn, further
weakens the substantive screen since it means that the PTO has to handle many
more patent applications. Like any large organization, the PTO cannot scale

57 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 68-72; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 26-31 (2009); JAFFE & LERNER, supra
note 39, at 11-13.
58 See generally, e.g., James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social
Costs of Patent Trolls: Do Nonpracticing Entities Benefit Society by Facilitating Markets for Technology?,
REGULATION, Winter 2011–2012, at 26 (concluding that patent lawsuits brought by nonpracticing entities
have cost defendants a half-trillion dollars without meaningfully increasing the incentive to innovate).
59 A vicious cycle is “a sequence of reciprocal cause and effect in which two or more elements
intensify and aggravate each other, leading inexorably to a worsening of the situation.” Vicious Cycle,
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 1978 (3d ed. 2010).
60 See supra notes 1, 13 and accompanying text.
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examination indefinitely without losing efficiency. As the number of applications
goes up, then, the cost of examining each application will likewise rise, or the
quality of examination will fall. This effect stems from three separate costs that
increase nonlinearly: personnel costs, coordination costs, and search costs.
The relationship between the substantive screen and the costly screen is
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Vicious Cycle
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This Part is organized into two Sections. Section II.A explains how the
flawed substantive screen undermines the costly screen—as shown in the top
arrow in Figure 1. Section II.B explains how the flawed costly screen undermines
the substantive screen—as shown in the bottom arrow.
A. How a Flawed Substantive Screen Undermines the Costly Screen
As a substantive screen, patent examination is supposed to ensure that an
applicant is awarded a patent only when she is legally entitled to it—only when
she has invented something new, useful, and nonobvious.61 When examiners
perform this task correctly, all is well; inventors are precisely the people who

61 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012). These are not the only requirements to obtain a patent, but
they are the most fundamental.
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are supposed to enjoy the benefits of a patent monopoly.62 But when examiners
fail at this task, things get more complicated. These flaws in the substantive
screen end up weakening the value of examination as a costly screen because
they increase both the incentive to apply for a weak patent and the expected
value of a weak application.63 Since the expected value of applying for a
patent is greater, even for a patent that is likely invalid, the cost of obtaining
a patent has less of a deterrent effect.
This effect stems from the convergence of three factors. First, patent
examination is an imperfect process, such that examination outcomes are an
unreliable indicator of whether a patent applicant is entitled to a patent. Though
it is impossible to know exactly how large this problem is, patent scholars and
lawyers agree that examiners grant many patents on inventions that either
had already been invented or were obvious when they were conceived, and so
are not legally entitled to a patent.64 There are different explanations for why
examiners cannot or do not perfectly sort deserving and undeserving patent
applications: examiners may lack the incentives or the time to act as perfect
screeners, or examination may just be an impossible task to perform at the
scale of the modern patent system.65 But the bottom line is that examiners
routinely grant patents on inventions that probably should not be patented.

62 I set aside the issue of whether patent law strikes normatively correct balances in all its
particulars. An omniscient approach to patent law might grant patents only when consistent with
the incentive model underlying patent law. Such a system would undoubtedly produce different
outcomes in some cases, even setting aside implementation mistakes in the current system. But
errors that come from misapplying patent law are a qualitatively different problem, since they might
(and, in many cases, do) allow applicants who have not invented anything to obtain patent protection,
and since they could, in theory, be corrected.
63 I say “weak” rather than “invalid” because it is very hard to know, ex ante, whether an
eventual patent will be held valid or invalid, since often it is difficult to predict when filing a patent
application how broad or narrow the claims an examiner will approve.
64 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 39, at 12 (noting that recent decades’ “rapid increase
in the rate of patenting has been accompanied by a proliferation of patent awards of dubious merit”);
Farrell & Merges, supra note 39, at 944-46 (describing examples of and traditional explanations for
“blatantly silly patents,” and urging reform of the PTO to prevent such low-quality patents from
being issued); Ford, supra note 10, at 87-91 (explaining that the PTO might issue invalid patents
because of bad incentives, overwhelming application volume, and poor information); Lemley,
Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1495-97 (collecting academic and popular criticism of high patent
issuance rates); Merges, supra note 11, at 589-91 (discussing reasons for poor patent quality); Sawicki,
supra note 39, at 736-39 (discussing types of harm from different kinds of mistakes in patent
issuance); Wagner, supra note 5, at 2139-45 (arguing that we should care about patent quality in part
because proliferation of low-quality patents increases marketplace uncertainty, masks erroneous
denials of meritorious applications, and leads to increased litigation costs); cf. BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 39, at 46-72 (arguing that patent law’s inability to draw clear boundaries should make us
question whether patent rights are true property rights).
65 Ford, supra note 10, at 88-89.
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And these likely invalid patents include many that are routinely licensed and
enforced in court.66
The second factor is that prosecuting a patent application is relatively
inexpensive. There are two components to application costs: the administrative
fees charged by the PTO and the legal fees of the attorney prosecuting the
application. It costs just $70 to $280 to file a utility-patent application, depending
on the applicant’s size, plus search ($150 to $600) and examination ($180 to
$720) fees.67 If the examiner concludes that the applicant is entitled to a patent,
add an issuance fee of $240 to $960.68 Other fees are assessed for things like
deadline extensions or unusually large applications,69 but in general it is hard
for a routine patent application to rack up more than a few thousand dollars
in PTO fees.70 As discussed above, add in attorney fees, and a typical patent
will cost $20,000 to $30,000 to obtain.71 And as we will see, that cost is often
small compared to the expected benefit.
The third factor is that once a patent is granted it often has substantial
value, even if it is unlikely to be valid. This value stems from different sources.
One source of value is rooted in uncertainty: it is very difficult to tell, ex ante,
66 Nearly half of all patents litigated to a final judgment are invalidated. Allison & Lemley,
supra note 41, at 205-07. But it is hard to conclude much about patents in general from this statistic,
given the different selection effects that determine what patents are litigated and what litigations go
to final judgment. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 41.
67 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO FEE SCHEDULE (2014 ed., rev. 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO%20fee%20schedule_current.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EVT3-T8NT] [hereinafter PTO, FEE SCHEDULE].
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 It is possible to corroborate these numbers for the patent system as a whole, albeit with a
relatively large margin of error. In the 2013 fiscal year, the PTO’s total fee revenue for the patent program
was $2.46 billion. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 77-78, 92 (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTO
FY2013PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZZ8-HZJR] [hereinafter PTO, 2013 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]
(reporting earned revenue of $2.7199 billion, 90.4% of which was attributable to the patent side of
the ledger). In calendar year 2013, the PTO received 609,052 patent applications of all kinds and
granted 302,948 patents. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART:
CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2014, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://
perma.cc/GY6P-XFMX] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) [hereinafter PTO, PATENT STATISTICS 1963–2014].
The agency’s fee revenue on an ongoing basis, then, was about $4000 per application and $8100 per
patent. This does not mean that the average application or patent costs that much; some of that revenue
comes from maintenance fees on older patents, and some comes from unsuccessful applications. Still, the
numbers provide a reasonable order-of-magnitude estimate of the fees necessary to prosecute a patent
application and obtain a patent.
71 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. One patent lawyer estimated in 2011 that attorney
fees for a typical patent application could vary from $5000 to $7000 for an “extremely simple”
invention like a coat hanger or an ice-cube tray, to more than $15,000 for a “highly complex” invention
like an MRI scanner or a networking system. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patentin-the-us/id=56485/ [https://perma.cc/WY8D-LKZ3].
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whether a court would invalidate a patent, so even a seemingly weak patent
has value stemming from the possibility that it will be upheld by a court.72
Another source of value is the cost of litigating infringement claims. Patent
litigation is notoriously expensive, with typical cases costing millions of
dollars in legal fees and expenses.73 So potential infringers are often willing
to license even patents of dubious validity.
Since settlement allows a defendant to avoid the substantial costs of litigating
even a frivolous claim, even a nakedly invalid patent can have a substantial
nuisance-settlement value.74 Accordingly, a patent holder will bring a case not
only when it expects the court to award damages greater than the cost of
bringing the case, but also when it expects to receive a sufficiently large
nuisance settlement.
To express these points mathematically, the expected value from a patent
P, enforced against the universe of potential defendants, can be modeled as
E(P) =

max[nvd , pd rd cd ] ,
d D

where D is the probability distribution of sets of potential defendants,75 d is
an individual defendant from that distribution, nvd is the nuisance value of a
claim against defendant d (net of the plaintiff ’s litigation costs), pd is the
probability that the plaintiff wins against defendant d, rd is the recovery the
plaintiff would obtain from defendant d if the plaintiff wins, and cd is the
plaintiff ’s litigation costs of prosecuting the case against defendant d to a final

72 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at
75, 80-83 (describing patents as “lottery tickets” carrying uncertain, but potentially enormous, value).
73 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
74 Under the standard model of settlement, rational litigants settle disputes to avoid litigation
costs. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275-76 (2006) (“The traditional expected value mode of
analysis suggests that [a] case will settle for its discounted expected value.”). Since the cost of
defending even a frivolous patent suit is often in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, see infra note
81 and accompanying text, in the absence of fee shifting or a threat of sanctions, both sides will
rationally settle for $100,000 or more in many cases. See, e.g., Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Dispute
Resolution, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 500, 500-02 (Steven N. Durlauf
& Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); see also David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to
the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
42, 42-43 (2006) (analyzing why rational defendants might be willing to settle even when the plaintiffs
have weak cases).
75 A patent applicant may not know, when filing for a patent, what the set of potential defendants
will look like when the patent is granted. This is the case both because the patent can evolve over
the course of prosecution, changing the set of potential defendants, and because the relevant industry will
almost certainly evolve between the application filing and any subsequent infringement lawsuits. So
a potential patent applicant must consider the different ways the set of potential defendants could evolve;
the model does this by summing over a probability distribution of possible sets of potential defendants.
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judgment. But both nvd and pd can be substantial in patent cases, even with a
seemingly weak patent. The intuition is this. The model assumes that patent
holders will seek to enforce their patents against all plausible defendants, and
that parties to a given case will know early how strong the case is. A strong
case will have a value dictated by the likelihood of success and the eventual
recovery; even if the case is settled, as most are, the settlement will be for the
expected value of the case if it were litigated to final judgment. (This is the
term pd rd – cd in the expected-value formula.) A weak case, however, has an
expected return from litigation to final judgment that is smaller than the
nuisance-settlement value, because, for instance, pd, the probability of success,
is small. So with a weak case, the value of suing defendant d is just the
nuisance value, nvd. Aggregating the value of each case against a potential
defendant d (the greater of nvd and pd rd – cd) gives the expected value of the
patent. Accordingly, while a patent is surely worth more if it is likely to be
upheld by a court, even a relatively weak patent can have substantial expected
value if there are enough potential defendants.
Patent law does contain doctrines that could limit the ability of patent
holders to extract nuisance settlements and thus reduce the value of weak
patents, but those doctrines are offset by ones working in the other direction.
For instance, the Patent Act has a fee-shifting provision that permits a court
to award a defendant attorney fees in exceptional cases.76 This provision was
mostly toothless until 2014,77 when the Supreme Court gave district courts
broader discretion to award attorney fees in patent cases.78 If district courts
take advantage of this broader discretion, then the nuisance value of a weak
patent claim may fall, since defendants will have less incentive to settle cases
and avoid litigation costs. At the same time, courts are also required to
presume that a patent claim is valid unless an accused infringer proves
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.79 This presumption makes it easier
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
Under the Federal Circuit’s previous cases interpreting § 285, to recover fees a defendant
had to prove that the patent holder either engaged in misconduct (in the litigation or while obtaining
the patent) or brought a case that was both objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith.
Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013), abrogated by Octane
Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Brooks Furniture Mfg. v.
Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749.
78 See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756-58 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture test,
and holding that under § 285, an “‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with
respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in
which the case was litigated”); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744,
1748-49 (2014) (holding that district court determinations under § 285 should be reviewed for abuse
of discretion, not de novo).
79 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (requiring that patents be “presumed valid”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that this presumption may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence); Ford, supra note 10, at 103-04 (arguing that the nonadversarial nature
76
77
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for a patent holder to win with a patent of dubious validity and increases the
value of an issued patent, since it changes the patent holder’s likelihood of
success in litigation and the relative bargaining powers of the litigants. It also
makes it harder to argue that a claim is exceptional and should be the subject
of a fee award, since nearly every patent holder can make at least a good-faith
claim of validity.
Each of these factors—the unreliability of patent examination, the low cost
of patent prosecution, and the value of even a weak patent—can have effects
on its own, but, when combined, they yield an especially perverse result. Since
even a weak patent often has substantial value once granted, and the PTO
frequently grants weak patents, the expected value of applying for a weak
patent can also be substantial. Yet this is precisely the scenario that a costly
screen is supposed to prevent.
In this simple model, a potential applicant considering whether to file for
a patent would do so if and only if its expected value is positive. This expected
value is the expected value of the granted patent, as described above, multiplied
by the probability of obtaining the patent, minus the cost of patent prosecution.
So the expected value from patent application A is
E( A) = pA

max[nvd , pd rd cd ] cA ,
d D

where pA is the probability that the prosecution of application A will result in
a granted patent, cA is the cost of prosecuting application A, and the other
values are contingent upon the patent being granted.
But the factors described above mean that the expected value of applying
for a patent will often be large even when the patent would likely be invalid.
The first factor, the unreliability of patent prosecution, means that pA (the
probability of obtaining a granted patent) is above zero even for a weak
application. The second factor, the low cost of prosecuting a patent application,
means that cA (the cost of patent prosecution) is insubstantial compared to
the potential value of the patent. And the third factor, the value of any granted
patent, means that nvd (the nuisance value of a patent) and the summation term
are both large. So all three factors tend to increase the expected value of a
patent application: pA is larger than it would be if the PTO effectively sorted
deserving and undeserving applications; cA is smaller than it would be if

of patent prosecution and the limited time spent reviewing each application undermine the
traditional rationale for the presumption of validity); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53-56 (2007) (arguing that a presumption of
validity predicated on deference to the PTO’s expert decisionmaking makes little sense because PTO
review will inherently be limited by budget constraints and the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings).
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applying for a patent were expensive; and the summation term is large because
the nuisance value, nvd, is substantial even for a weak patent.
How do these factors undermine the costly screen? The cost of obtaining
a patent is supposed to deter applicants from seeking low-value patents,
including invalid patents. But if the potential upside from applying for such
a patent is large, and the cost of doing so is small, then the examination process
will not deter applicants from seeking invalid patents.
It is worth putting these variables into concrete terms. As discussed above,
the cost of prosecuting a patent application, cA, is on the order of $20,000 to
$30,000.80 But the cost of litigating a patent case is much greater—frequently
hundreds of thousands of dollars even in low-stakes cases.81 And since the
whole point of a nuisance settlement is to avoid this litigation cost, settlements
of $100,000 or more are common, even in cases involving facially weak patents
or claims.82 But even if the nuisance value of a claim against a particular
defendant, nvd, is less than $100,000, when aggregated across multiple defendants,
the expected value of a weak granted patent,
max[nvd , pd rd cd ],

can be hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars—well more than an
application cost, cA, of $30,000.

80 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. This number might be falling, as clients increasingly
demand flat-fee and bulk-rate patent prosecution. Gene Quinn, The Strange Case of the Vanishing
Patent Boutiques, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/06/the-strangecase-of-the-vanishing-patent-boutiques/id=9877 [https://perma.cc/N6F2-732F].
81 See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
2015, at I-105, I-108 (2015) (finding, based on a survey of patent lawyers, that the median cost of
litigating a case through trial was $400,000 for each side in patent cases with less than $1 million at
stake, and $3 million for each side when more than $25 million was at stake).
82 Much of this cost is due to discovery, so the prospect of summary judgment is not usually a
meaningful constraint on the litigation cost. See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation
Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 196-99 (2015). When a defendant can obtain a pre-discovery dismissal,
litigation costs are much lower, though such cases are relatively rare in patent law. In the last few
years, however, dismissals have become more common in one category of cases: those involving
software patents, thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). In that case, the patent claims at issue covered software methods of mitigating
settlement risk in financial transactions. Id. at 2352. The Court held that the claims were not directed
to patent-eligible subject matter because they covered simple computer implementations of abstract
ideas. Id. at 2359-60. Several courts have dismissed software-patent cases since Alice, and since
patent eligibility is a question of law, little or no discovery is required beforehand. See Brian McCall,
Lessons from 4 Months of Post-Alice Decisions, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/590465/lessons-from-4-months-of-post-alice-decisions [https://perma.cc/92ZY-77DL] (observing
that four of the six courts that decided motions to dismiss patent claims in the four months after the
Alice decision held the patents to be invalid).
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The hardest quantity to estimate is the probability, pA, that an examiner
would grant a weak patent—a measure of how reliable patent examination is.
This value is hard to determine because it is almost impossible to know,
without an expensive examination of a particular patent, whether an invention is
really patentable and whether the decision to grant the patent was correct. If
there were an easy method for figuring this out, examiners could just turn to
that method and the process would be reliable. And though economists and
legal scholars have proposed different measures of patent quality, many of
them focus on factors other than whether the PTO was correct or not in
granting a patent.83 But if the cost of prosecuting a patent application, cA, is
$30,000, and the value of the patent, once granted, is $150,000—a reasonably
conservative order-of-magnitude estimate in many industries84—then the
probability of obtaining a patent, pA, only has to be over 20% to make applying
for a weak patent worthwhile. Indeed, as discussed above, there are good
reasons to suspect that the examination process is systematically flawed,85 which
suggests that pA may be at least that large.
The point, of course, does not depend on the precise value of any of these
quantities. Rather, it is that as examination becomes less reliable and examiners
become more likely to grant invalid patents, the cost of obtaining a patent

83 See Guerrini, supra note 39, at 3126-37 (suggesting factors—a patent’s likelihood of validity,
clarity, faithfulness to the invention, social utility, and commercial success—that could be used to
evaluate patent quality). But see Wagner, supra note 5, at 2138-39 (distinguishing between patent
value and patent quality and arguing that the latter term solely addresses whether a patent satisfies
the Patent Act’s statutory requirements).
84 In the information-technology industries, for example, numerous patent portfolios have
been sold for six figures per patent. See, e.g., Steven Church, Tim Culpan & Devin Banerjee, Apple
Joins Microsoft, RIM in $4.5 Billion Buy of Nortel Patents, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2011, 12:18 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-01/nortel-sells-patent-portfolio-for-4-5-billion-to
-group [https://perma.cc/V73L-HM2A] (reporting the sale of more than 6000 telecommunications
patents for $4.5 billion, approximately $750,000 per patent); Steve Lohr, Microsoft’s AOL Deal
Intensifies Patent Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/technology/
microsoft-to-buy-aol-patents-for-more-than-1-billion.html [https://perma.cc/5NKE-V99X] (reporting
the sale of 800 Internet patents, plus a license to 300 more, for $1.056 billion, approximately $960,000
per patent licensed or purchased); id. (noting that of the $12.5 billion Google paid for Motorola
Mobility, more than half might represent the value of Motorola Mobility’s 17,000 patents, at more
than $400,000 per patent). Much of this value, of course, is likely attributable to the value of the
claimed inventions, or the defensive value of the patents, rather than the patents’ nuisance or enforcement
value. But one telling portfolio sale is Round Rock Research’s purchase of 20% of Micron Technology’s
patent portfolio. Patrick Anderson, Micron Retains Interest in Round Rock Patent Monetization Proceeds,
GAMETIME IP (May 9, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012/05/09/micron-retains-interest-in-round-rockpatent-monetization-proceeds [https://perma.cc/MG8Q-EREN]. Round Rock is a litigation-focused
nonpracticing entity that reportedly paid $400 million for 4500 Micron patents, which is about $90,000
per patent. Id. On the problems and complexities that arise in valuing patents, see WILLIAM J.
MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION
MAKING THROUGH ANALYSIS (2012).
85 See supra notes 37–49 and accompanying text.
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becomes less meaningful as a screen. This happens because as examination
becomes less reliable, pA changes accordingly, increasing the expected value
of a patent application. And this effect is exacerbated by several endogenous
features of the patent system, such as the cost of patent litigation and the
heightened burden of proof for invalidity defenses. This is the first half of the
vicious cycle.
B. How a Flawed Costly Screen Undermines the Substantive Screen
The costly screen’s shortcomings also weaken the substantive screen. As
patent examination becomes a less effective costly screen, more and more
people apply for patents, invalid or otherwise. This, in turn, further reduces
the reliability of patent examination, making the substantive screen less
effective. The patent system, like any large bureaucracy, cannot scale indefinitely
without losing efficiency—the law of diminishing returns applies to hiring
within an organization like it does anywhere else86—so as the number of
patent applications increases, the cost of examining each application will
necessarily increase, or the quality of examination will necessarily fall.
There are at least three different categories of costs that increase as the
number of applications and examiners increase: personnel costs, coordination
costs, and research costs.
1. Personnel Costs
As applicants file more patent applications, the PTO has to hire more
examiners, which, all else being equal, will lead to lower-quality examinations.
The PTO is a huge agency, with nearly 12,000 employees, including more
than 8000 patent examiners.87 Since examiner turnover is fairly high, the
PTO hires a lot of examiners each year.88 The more examiners that have to be
hired each year, the harder this task becomes. So, as the number of applications
and examiners increases, the average quality of examination will necessarily
fall, unless the PTO devotes greater resources to the problem.
This talent dilution stems from the sheer size of the PTO. An organization
that hires 500 new employees per year can select the 500 best applicants (or
86 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-62 (8th ed. 2003).
87 As of September 30, 2013, the PTO had 11,773 federal employees, including 8051 patent
examiners and 409 trademark examiners. PTO, 2013 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 70, at 9.
88 Historically, most examiners left the PTO after less than three years. John Schmid, Turnover
Troubles Agency: Workload, Low Pay Keep Doors Revolving, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 16, 2009),

http://www.jsonline.com/business/53365652.html [https://perma.cc/Z7YF-GJX8]. In recent years,
however, the PTO has reduced turnover, in part by giving examiners the flexibility to telework.
PTO, 2013 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 70, at 4.

2016]

The Patent Spiral

851

the 500 best applicants who will accept an offer), but if that organization has
to hire 1000 new employees in a year, those 500 applicants will only fill half
the quota. The rest will have to come from a less qualified part of the applicant
pool. Let’s say there are 500 “A” examiner candidates in a year. If the PTO
has to hire 500 examiners, it can hire only “A” candidates, but if it has to hire
1000 examiners, it will have to dip into the pool of “B” and maybe “C”
candidates for the second 500 hires. Overall quality will suffer. Of course, the
hiring process is not this simple in the real world; applicants fall on a spectrum,
not into discrete buckets. The point is that quality differences between
applicants exist, and these differences matter when the PTO increases hiring.
These quality differences between hires can manifest themselves in different
ways. Perhaps lower-quality examiners are likely to commit substantive errors,
granting invalid patents or rejecting meritorious applications. If so, the effect
on examination as a substantive screen is clear: lower-quality examiners would
increase the likelihood of obtaining a low-quality patent. Or, perhaps, lowerquality examiners are just slower, increasing the time it takes to process a
patent application. This has a subtler effect: it makes it more expensive to
obtain a patent, in nonmonetary costs like delayed patent protections and,
perhaps, in monetary costs like extra attorney fees. This slowdown can have a
salutary effect: by increasing the cost of obtaining a patent, it could strengthen
the role of examination as a costly screen. But it also increases the cost of
obtaining a valid patent, and does so in a particularly inefficient way, compared
to alternatives like increasing the issuance fee.89
The PTO could overcome these effects by investing greater resources into
the examination process, either by paying examiners more to attract better
applicants or hiring more examiners to process fewer applications each. And
in times of economic downturn, the pool of potential examiners will be larger,
and of higher quality, mitigating the problem. It is also possible that growth
in the PTO is matched by growth in the number of potential examiners, so
that increasing numbers of patent applications do not lead to problems of
examiner quality. But these mitigating effects are necessarily temporary;
recessions pass, and if the quality of examination is declining over time, then the
PTO can increase personnel costs only so much before it becomes financially
unsupportable.90
See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
The PTO is funded through fees paid by patent holders and applicants. 35 U.S.C. § 42
(2012). Though Congress could, of course, make up any shortfall in the PTO’s budget caused by
greater personnel costs, such a strategy could only go so far, and at all events Congress has been far
more willing to take money from the PTO than to appropriate additional money for its use. See Arti
K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial
Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2057 n.24 (2009) (noting that Congress redirected hundreds of
millions dollars in patent fees during the 1990s).
89
90
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2. Coordination Costs
As applicants file more patent applications, and the PTO hires more
examiners, its coordination costs will also increase. Indeed, this is the traditional
explanation for diminishing returns as an organization expands.91 As the size
of an organization increases, so too do the number of decisionmakers, the
number of people who have to be consulted on a decision, and the number of
people to whom a decision must be communicated. Beyond a certain size, the
sheer number of connections between people overwhelms gains from
specialization, and the costs of making and implementing decisions begin to
rise as the organization grows larger.92
Patent examination is largely an independent, parallelizable activity that
involves one examiner per application, not a team that must coordinate.
Accordingly, increased coordination costs likely occur not at the examiner
level, but at management levels.93 These managers include workers in the
Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations, the Office of
Patent Examination Policy, and the Office of Patent Administration, who are
charged with coordinating patent examination across nine technology centers,
establishing examination policies and procedures, monitoring patent quality,
reviewing and responding to changes in patent law from courts and Congress,
and managing the PTO’s resources and strategic planning.94 All these decisions
take time and involve numerous workers, and as the PTO grows, they are likely
to take longer and may be more likely to go wrong.
This effect may be muted since, as mentioned above, patent examiners
work largely individually. At the same time, though, effects at the management
level are likely to trickle down to line examiners. This could happen in several
See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 86, at 6.
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394 (1937) (“[A]s a firm
gets larger . . . the costs of organising additional transactions within the firm may rise.”); Stephen J.
DeCanio & William E. Watkins, Information Processing and Organizational Structure, 36 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 275, 289 (1998) (observing, based on a statistical model, “that an organization’s size
may constrain its speed in adopting innovations”); Michael Keren & David Levhari, Decentralization,
Aggregation, Control Loss and Costs in a Hierarchical Model of the Firm, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
213, 221-23 (1989) (identifying circumstances under which unit costs are certain to increase as the
size of an organization grows due to coordination costs and increased errors); Michael Keren &
David Levhari, The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs, 14 BELL J. ECON.
474, 481 (1983) [hereinafter Keren & Levhari, Internal Organization] (concluding that marginal
production costs are unlikely to decrease indefinitely as an organization increases in size because of
increases in coordination costs).
93 In the terms of the organizational-theory literature, the examiners are the production
workers—“specialized units whose exact mode of operation has to be coordinated by the supervising
hierarchy in accordance with changing circumstances”—while the rest of the PTO is that hierarchy.
Keren & Levhari, Internal Organization, supra note 92, at 475.
94 Office of the Commissioner for Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
about/offices/patents/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/VEL3-NUN9] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
91
92
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ways. Increased coordination costs could lead to lower-quality policies and
procedures within the PTO or lower-quality communication from management
to examiners. They could also hurt the agency’s responsiveness to changes in
the law.95 All of these effects would reduce the reliability of examination as a
substantive screen. Accordingly, the consequences of coordination problems
in the PTO might be stronger than they appear at first glance.
3. Research Costs
Finally, as applicants file more patent applications, and more patents are
granted, the PTO’s research costs will also increase. Patent examination is
fundamentally a research job: the most important thing examiners do is compare
applications to the prior art to determine if applicants have really invented things
that are useful, novel, and nonobvious. But searching for prior art is a notoriously
difficult and costly process, and the greater the universe of possible prior art, the
harder and costlier it can become.
Searching for prior art is a labor-intensive process. In a typical search, the
searcher will look for similar patents and patent applications issued by or filed
in the PTO, the European Patent Office, or the Japan Patent Office. Depending
on the scope of the search and the searcher’s diligence, she may also review
patents issued by other countries or search for nonpatent prior art in various
databases of engineering and scientific research. Prior-art searches are conducted
both by patent examiners and by private attorneys, who may be trying to
determine whether a patent is likely to survive litigation or may be looking
for prior art to invalidate it. In the private sector, searches to identify potentially
invalidating prior art for litigation start in the $500 to $2000 range, and
depending on the scope of a search, its technical complexity, and the expertise
of the searcher, can easily cost $10,000, $20,000, or more.96 And these estimates
are just the cost of identifying potentially relevant prior art, not analyzing
the prior art to see if it invalidates a patent claim. That second step can take
attorneys and experts dozens or hundreds of hours.
Searches performed by patent examiners are necessarily more cursory
than those performed by litigants, since examiners have far less time and a
95 The PTO routinely issues memoranda to examiners addressing changes in the law, especially
after Supreme Court decisions or particularly important Federal Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Memorandum
from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, to Patent Examining Corps, Preliminary Examination Instructions in View of the Supreme
Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. (June 25, 2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM5D-45RW] (providing
guidance on how to apply the Court’s interpretation of the patentable-subject-matter requirement,
six days after the Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)).
96 These estimates are based on the author’s litigation experience and conversations with patent
litigators and prior-art searchers in private practice.
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comprehensive search is only cost effective when a patent is important enough
to be litigated.97 But both kinds of searches are subject to the same fundamental
constraint: the difficulty and time required to conduct a search vary linearly
with the size of the prior-art universe being searched. If there are twice as
many patents relating to wireless networking or benzodiazepine drugs or online
shopping carts, then a searcher will have to sort through twice as many prior-art
references and spend twice as long analyzing them to determine if an invention is
patentable in view of that prior art. So if the examination process becomes less of
a costly screen and applicants file more patent applications, examiners will have to
work harder to review those applications, further weakening the substantive screen.
None of these effects is inescapable. As I discuss below, the PTO has means
to combat increasing personnel costs, coordination costs, and research costs.98
But these means are themselves costly and can only reduce the problem, not
eliminate it completely. And the patent system is growing so quickly that scale
effects are likely inevitable, with consequences that require careful examination.
III. TESTING THE VICIOUS CYCLE
The vicious-cycle theory developed in Part II makes several predictions
about patent examination in the real world. Though many of these predicted
effects—like a reduction in the reliability of patent examinations—are hard
to measure, others are borne out by the data. This Part takes a preliminary
look at that empirical evidence. It first reviews some testable hypotheses that
follow from the theory and then reviews data suggesting that the theory is
consistent with developments in the patent system.
A. Testable Hypotheses
The vicious-cycle theory predicts broad effects in several aspects of the patent
system, including both patent examination and the behavior of patent holders
after patents have been issued. These predictions fall into three broad categories.
First, the theory makes predictions about the scale of the examination
system. If applicants apply for more and more patents with applications of
lower and lower quality, then we should expect the numbers of patents and
patent applications to increase over time. We should also see corresponding
growth in the number of patent examiners. These effects should persist even
when correcting for other factors that could lead to more patents and patent

97
98

See generally Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3.
See infra Section IV.C.
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applications, such as population growth, the globalization of the patent system,
and increases in innovation.99
Second, the theory makes predictions about the quality of patent
examination. The theory predicts that the reliability of examination—the ability
of patent examiners to accurately separate deserving and undeserving patent
applications—is declining over time, or, in the alternative, that the PTO is
expending more money to obtain the same results. These predictions are difficult
to test, however, because there are few or no high-quality predictors of whether
a patent is likely to be found valid.100
Third, the theory makes predictions about the behavior of litigants in
infringement suits. In particular, if applicants seek and obtain more low-value
patents, then we should see a rise in the number of low-value patent lawsuits.
99 This last factor is particularly important and difficult to quantify. Scholars have had a hard
time quantifying innovation other than by looking at patent data. See, e.g., Daniele Archibugi &
Mario Pianta, Measuring Technological Change Through Patents and Innovation Surveys, 16 TECHNOVATION
451, 463 (1996) (recognizing, despite patent data’s limitations, the increasing reliance in the empirical
literature on this data for measuring innovation, because the data are readily accessible and comparable
across countries). But the link between innovation and patent activity is uncertain at best, and the
vicious-cycle theory suggests another reason to be skeptical of innovation metrics that rely on
patents. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173,
180 (1986) (“Despite the fact that the patent system generally is defended at least partly on the
grounds that it increases the rate of innovation, the present study indicates that its effects in this
regard are very small in most of the industries we studied.”). But see Zoltan J. Acs, Luc Anselin &
Attila Varga, Patents and Innovation Counts as Measures of Regional Production of New Knowledge, 31
RES. POL’Y 1069, 1080 (2002) (“The empirical evidence suggests that patents provide a fairly reliable
measure of innovative activity.”). See generally Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Patents as a
Measure of Innovative Activity, 42 KYKLOS 171 (1989).
100 Several studies have examined indicators of patent value and unsurprisingly, all else being
equal, valid patents are likely to be more valuable than invalid patents. The most significant indicator
of patent value is the number of times that patent is cited in subsequent patents. See, e.g., Manuel
Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON.
172 (1990) (suggesting that the number of patent citations may be a reliable indicator of patent
value); cf. David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Popadak, Patent Value and Citations: Creative
Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13-065,
Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-23, 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2351809 [https://perma.cc/FJB4-MLTR] (finding that at lower patent values, citations
seem to be directly correlated with patent value, while at higher patent values, the relationship
inverts). Other indicators include the length of a patent, the number of claims, and the amount of
prior art cited in the patent. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R.
Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 451-55 (2004) (determining that, besides patent
citations, the number of claims and prior-art references were strong indicators of patent value, as
measured by likelihood of litigation); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 82-84 (suggesting that
the PTO should focus on applications with more claims and citations to prior art because these
factors are “correlated with greater ultimate value”); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1537-38 (2005) (finding that a patent’s number of claims was a
statistically significant indicator whether the patentee continued to pay patent maintenance fees, a
metric used to assess patent value). But these factors just predict value in the aggregate; they cannot
tell us whether an individual patent is likely to be held valid. To determine validity, there is no
efficient substitute for a costly prior-art search and expert evaluation.
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This effect could manifest itself in an increase in the absolute number of
nuisance-level settlements or in the proportion of patent cases that result in
such settlements, or in a fall in the average value of patent settlements. It
could also result in an increase in the number of cases dismissed by plaintiffs
early in the case, walking away when defendants appear unwilling to settle.
B. Some Empirical Evidence
Some of the predictions discussed in the last Section are more amenable to
testing than others, and what follows is only a preliminary examination of some
readily available data. Still, empirical data are consistent with the predictions
of the vicious-cycle theory in each of the three categories discussed above.
These trends are merely suggestive; they do not prove or disprove the theory,
or that examination quality is falling. These data, however, do suggest promising
avenues for further inquiry.
1. The Scale of the Patent-Examination System
Over the last several decades, the patent-examination system has shown the
growth predicted by the vicious-cycle theory. Both the number of patents issued
annually and the number of examiners have grown tremendously. The number
of utility patents granted grew from 56,860 in 1983 to 300,678 in 2014.101 This is
not just a reflection of population growth: in that same period, the number of
patents granted per year per 10,000 people in the United States went from 2.4 to
8.8.102 Nor is it just a reflection of the growth of patenting by foreign inventors;
limiting the set to patents issued to domestic inventors shows the same trend.103
In 1980, for instance, the PTO granted 1.6 U.S.-origin utility patents per 10,000
people in the United States; by 2013, that number had nearly tripled, growing
to 4.2 patents per 10,000 people. This trend is shown in Figure 2.

PTO, PATENT STATISTICS 1963–2014, supra note 70.
For the data that I used, see PTO, PATENT STATISTICS 1963–2014, supra note 70; Monthly
Population Estimates for the United States: April 1, 2010 to December 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec.
2014), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://
perma.cc/FH9Y-6X92]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES:
JULY 1, 1900 TO JULY 1, 1999 (2000), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/pre-1980/tables/
popclockest.txt [https://perma.cc/CU4V-8VSL] [hereinafter CENSUS, POPULATION ESTIMATES: 1900–
1999]. For consistency, I used the population estimate as of July 1 of each year.
103 Specifically, the number of such patents grew from 32,871 issued in 1983 to 133,593 in 2013,
a jump from 1.4 to 4.2 patents per 10,000 U.S. residents. See sources cited supra note 102.
101
102

2016]

857

The Patent Spiral

Figure 2: Population-Adjusted Patent Grants per Year (1963–2013)104
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Consistent with the growth in patent grants, there has also been a steady
growth in the number of examiners, increasing from 3061 at the end of the
PTO’s fiscal year 2001105 to 7831 at the end of 2012.106
There are several possible explanations for these trends, including some
that are optimistic. One possibility is that the United States has become
substantially more innovative over the last several decades, leading to more
inventions that are entitled to patent protection. The growth of the computer
104 The y-axis shows utility patents granted per 10,000 U.S. residents, with separate lines broken
out for patents issued to U.S. and foreign applicants. Population-adjusted figures were calculated
based on patent data from PTO, PATENT STATISTICS 1963–2014, supra note 70, and population data
from several U.S. Census Bureau sources. For 1963 to 1999, data were taken from CENSUS, POPULATION
ESTIMATES: 1900–1999, supra note 102. For 2000 to 2010, data were taken from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE FOR THE UNITED
STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2010 (2011), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/
tables/US-EST00INT-01.xls [https://perma.cc/K24R-3J8D]. For 2011 to 2013, data were taken from U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MONTHLY POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2010
TO NOVEMBER 1, 2013 (2013), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2012/tables/NA-EST201201.xls [https://perma.cc/K2VE-SNJ7]. For each year, the population as of July 1 was used in the calculation.
105 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 148 (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/ar/
USPTOFY2005PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH87-UYAJ].
106 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 203 (2012), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY
2012PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQR9-D6UC] [hereinafter PTO, 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
These numbers include examiners of utility, reissue, and plant patents (categories that are grouped by
the PTO), but not of design patents.
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and information industries could be responsible for much of this increase in
innovation. Indeed, the technology classes with the greatest patent growth
over the last two decades include several classes related to software, information
processing, and similar emerging technological fields.107 But I am not aware
of any reason to think that the United States has become 2.6 times as innovative,
on a per capita basis, since 1980. Another possibility is that firms have become
more sophisticated about protecting intellectual property rights to legitimate
innovations that would have remained unprotected earlier.
Yet this trend is also consistent with a pessimistic hypothesis: that the
growth in patent grants is driven by speculators obtaining the sort of low-value
patents that fail to pan out or that are asserted in nuisance litigation. Such an
account would be consistent with the predictions of the vicious-cycle theory.
2. The Quality of Patent Examination
It is difficult to measure directly the quality of patent examination, but
indirect measures may reveal patterns consistent with a reduction in examination
quality. Two such indirect measures—the average workload of a patent examiner
and the average pendency of a patent application—are consistent with the
vicious-cycle theory.
While the PTO has nearly tripled the size of its examiner corps over the
last decade, the average workload per examiner, as measured by the number
of applications handled annually, has fallen.108 Despite this decreased workload
per examiner, applications have taken longer to process, with the average
application pendency increasing over the same period.109 In 2001, for instance,
the average patent examiner was responsible for 107 patent applications and 54.6
granted patents. By 2012, however, those numbers had declined to 69.5
applications and 32.5 grants.110 These trends are shown in Figure 3.

107 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXTENDED YEAR SET—PATENTING BY
GEOGRAPHIC REGION (STATE AND COUNTRY), BREAKOUT BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS: COUNT
OF 1963–2014 UTILITY PATENT GRANTS AS DISTRIBUTED BY CALENDAR YEAR OF GRANT (2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/stcteca/allstcl_gd.htm [https://perma.cc/UJ9M-JKKK]
(showing the greatest growth in patent grants from 1990–1993 to 2010–2013 in technology classes,
including class 726, Information Security; 709, Multicomputer Data Transferring; 707, Database and
File Management or Data Structures; 717, Software Development, Installation, and Management;
719, Interprogram Communication or Interprocess Communication; and 800, Multicellular Living
Organisms and Unmodified Parts Thereof and Related Processes).
108 See infra Figure 3.
109 See infra Figure 4.
110 This trend appears to have begun in the early 2000s. Polk Wagner observed the beginning
of it in his 2009 article. Wagner, supra note 5, at 2159 fig.4.
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Figure 3: Patent Applications and Grants per Examiner per Year (2001–2012)111
120
100
80
applications
per examiner

60

grants per
examiner

40
20
0

2001

2006

2011

One possible explanation for this trend would be if the PTO was hiring
additional examiners to cut down on the backlog of patent applications—a
stated goal of the PTO.112 If examiners are spending more time clearing out
the backlog, then that will not be captured by a metric that looks at the
number of applications filed in one year. Yet, while examiners have handled
fewer applications, and thus presumably have more time to spend on each
patent application, the average pendency of patent applications has increased,
from 25 months in 2000 to 32.4 months in 2012 (and 35.3 months in 2010).
This trend is shown in Figure 4.

111 These numbers include utility, reissue, and plant patents, and exclude design patents.
Application and grant data were taken from PTO, PATENT STATISTICS 1963–2014, supra note 70.
Examiner data were taken from the PTO’s annual Performance and Accountability Reports, which are
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/performance-and-planning/uspto-annual-reports [https://
perma.cc/LS8V-FBEN].
112 See PTO, 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 17 (stating that “Strategic Goal
1” is to “Optimize Patent Quality and Timeliness”).
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Figure 4: Average Application Pendency (2000–2012)113
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As with the numbers of patent grants and examiners, both optimistic and
pessimistic explanations for these trends are possible. The optimistic explanation
is that when examiners spend more time on individual patent applications,
they may do a better job, leading to more accurate outcomes and fewer lowquality patents. There may be some truth to this account, since the data appear
to reflect a substantial increase in the amount of time an examiner spends on each
patent application. If each examiner works 2000 hours per year, then a patent
examiner in 2001 could dedicate only 18.7 hours to each of the 107 applications
assigned to her,114 an estimate that is largely consistent with past estimates of
the time an examiner spends on a typical application.115 But by 2012, with each
examiner responsible for 69.5 applications, each examiner could devote 28.8
hours to each application116—a 54% increase in the time available for each
application. If examiners make effective use of this extra time, then examination
outcomes may be substantially improved.
The pessimistic account, however, suggests that this increased time per
application could itself be a sign of lower-quality examinations. Lower-quality
examiners, for instance, might need more time to perform the tasks of patent
examination. And even if the extra time was enough to make up for a lower-quality

113 The dotted line shows average pendency, in months, for all utility-patent applications, while
the solid lines show trends for individual technology centers. Pendency data are from PTO, 2012
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 17.
114 See supra Figure 3.
115 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1500 (estimating that examiners spend
an average of about 18 hours on a patent application).
116 See supra Figure 3.
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corps of examiners, it would represent a substantially higher personnel cost for
the PTO. Without an independent metric of patent quality, it is hard to
distinguish between these two accounts. But the pessimistic account is consistent
with the predictions of the vicious-cycle theory, while there is little evidence
that patent quality has improved.
3. The Behavior of Patent Litigants
Finally, the behavior of patent litigants is consistent with the theory. Of
course, as others have observed, the sheer number of patent cases has increased
substantially in recent decades; for instance, in 2000, 2295 patent cases were
filed in federal district courts, while by 2010 that number had increased to
2714 cases, and by 2013 it had hit 6062 cases.117 The increase after 2010 represents
both growth in patent litigation and the increasing number of cases filed after
the joinder provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA) went into effect, making
it harder to join multiple defendants in one lawsuit.118
More notably, this group contains an increasing proportion of cases that
are terminated quickly, within six months of filing. These quickly terminated
cases are notable because they are more likely to represent low-quality patents,
nuisance suits, and low-value nuisance settlements or walk-away agreements.
For instance, RPX reported that more than half of lawsuits brought by
nonpracticing entities end within six months of filing.119 They thus provide a
useful proxy for lawsuits brought with low-quality patents.
To determine whether an increasing proportion of cases are terminated
within six months, I obtained a dataset of all 43,166 patent cases filed in federal
district courts between 2000 and 2013.120 For each case in the dataset, I calculated
the time from filing date to termination, as indicated in PACER. Next, I
constructed a categorical dependent variable with a value equal to 1 if the time
from filing to termination was 180 days or less, and 0 if the time was more than
180 days or if the case was ongoing. I then performed a logistic regression with
the independent variable equal to the filing date (normalized to years) and the
categorical dependent variable.

117 These numbers are from Lex Machina, a database of intellectual property litigation. LEX
MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com/ (search conducted Sept. 18, 2014). On the benefits of using
Lex Machina, rather than sources like LexisNexis, Westlaw, or PACER, see John R. Allison, Mark
A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1772-73 (2014). For just a few of the many observers noting the growth of patent litigation,
see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 120-64; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 39, at 11-16.
118 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
119 RPX, 2013 LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 37 chart 55.
120 The dataset was kindly provided by Lex Machina. See supra note 117.
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The results indicate a slight, but statistically significant, increase over
time in the proportion of cases that were terminated within 180 days.121 This
increase is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Quickly Terminated Cases (2000–2013)122
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There are different possible explanations for this trend. One explanation
consistent with the vicious-cycle theory is that as the quality of patent
examination declines, more low-quality patents are issued and more low-value
patent lawsuits are brought. The greater proportion of quickly terminated cases,
then, corresponds to the increasing number of early settlements and nuisance suits.
An alternative explanation is that litigants have become more sophisticated
and willing to settle quickly as the number of patent lawsuits has grown.
Especially among defendants, there may be an increasing willingness to see
patent litigation as a cost center that must be managed through tools like quick
settlements. It is also possible that the AIA has bolstered the trend by making
it harder to sue numerous defendants in one case. If multiple defendants are
joined in one lawsuit, that suit will have a termination date corresponding to the
last defendant to resolve the case, rather than one termination date corresponding
to each defendant. The trend, however, predates the AIA, suggesting that it
cannot account for the entire increase.
121 The estimated coefficient for the filing-date independent variable is β = 0.01557, with
p = 1.02 × 10−10, statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level.
122 Figure 5 shows the proportion of patent cases filed in federal district courts terminated within
180 days of filing. The regression coefficient corresponds to an increase in the probability that a case
will be quickly terminated of approximately 0.34% per year over the relevant period.
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It is important to emphasize the limitations of these findings. I am not
aware of direct evidence that the PTO is actually hiring lower-quality examiners,
or that patent or examination quality has fallen. But the evidence does show
that over the last few decades, the patent system has expanded far faster than
is easily explained by population growth, globalization, or increased innovation.
One possible explanation is that patents have been increasingly used in socially
undesirable ways—for example, to extract rents from successful firms. The
evidence also suggests that even though the PTO has hired more examiners
to keep pace with the growth in applications, examiner productivity has not
kept up with that growth. And the data show that more patent cases are resolved
quickly, suggesting that a greater portion of patent cases consists of low-value
nuisance lawsuits. These findings are consistent with, if not demonstrative of,
the predictions of the vicious-cycle theory and a decline in patent quality.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND REFORMS
The news is not all bad. One key implication of the vicious-cycle theory
is that policymakers have substantial flexibility in designing patent reforms,
because the effect of a reform on one piece of the cycle will propagate to the
rest of the cycle. This Part discusses that flexibility. It first discusses how
reforms to different pieces of the vicious cycle would propagate to the rest of
the cycle. It then discusses some specific reforms that could help temper the
vicious cycle, both by targeting the substantive and costly screens and by
reducing their interactions.
A. Flexible Patent Reforms
A vicious cycle is a feedback loop: each step of the cycle triggers the next
step, so any interruption of the cycle would prevent the feedback loop from
continuing. This gives reformers a lot of power, since a reform that affects
any step in the cycle would produce effects throughout the cycle. In this cycle,
there are four possible targets for reform: the flawed substantive screen and
costly screen, and the links between the two screens that allow the flaws in
one screen to undermine the other screen. These latter two targets correspond
to the arrows in Figure 1.
This flexibility is fairly straightforward. If reforms fixed the problems with
the substantive screen so that an examination outcome was a reliable indicator
of whether an invention was patentable, there would be no incentive to apply
for the sort of low-quality patents that are most likely to be asserted in nuisance
litigation. The costly screen, then, would better deter applicants from seeking
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low-value patents. Likewise, if the costly screen were more effective—e.g., if
the cost of obtaining a patent were greater than its nuisance value—then there
would be fewer patent applicants, and the examination system would not need to
keep up with the same massive growth in patent applications.
Even if the flaws in the substantive screen and costly screen persist, reforms
to other elements of the patent system could mitigate the vicious cycle by
disrupting the causal links between the flawed screens. For example, reforms
that would reduce the value of low-quality patents—including measures that make
it harder to exploit these patents in nuisance litigation—would discourage applicants
from seeking low-quality patents even if a flawed substantive screen would
grant them. This reduction in the value of low-quality patents would make the costly
screen more effective. Likewise, reforms that would make it easier for the
examination system to scale would help maintain the quality of patent examination
even in the face of growth from a flawed costly screen. Flaws in the costly screen,
then, would have less of an effect on the substantive screen. The next two Sections
discuss different reforms that could accomplish these two goals.
B. Fixing the Screens
Reforms that would make patent examination better at fulfilling its role
as a substantive screen or as a costly screen would have the most direct effect
on the examination system. Improving the substantive screen, however, would
be difficult or even impossible without massively increasing the cost of the
patent system. Improving the costly screen, in contrast, would be straightforward
because it simply requires increasing the cost to obtain a patent, but such a
measure would also deter applicants from seeking some high-quality patents.
1. Fixing the Substantive Screen
One set of reforms would work to improve patent examination as a substantive
screen. Scholars and policymakers have made numerous proposals aimed at
improving the quality of patent examination, and I have little to add to their
proposals.123 In general, these proposals fall into two categories. One class of
proposals seeks to devote greater resources to patent examination. It is far
from clear, however, that doing so would be cost effective, especially since most
123 For just a few of the many articles discussing how to improve patent examination, see John
R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a
Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Can the
Patent Office Be Fixed?, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 295 (2011); Michael Meehan, Increasing
Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, STAN.
TECH. L. REV., Feb. 2010; Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for
Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2005); Stephen Yelderman,
Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2014).
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patents are never asserted and it is hard to tell, ex ante, which patents will prove
important.124
The other class of proposals seeks to give examiners more information to
use in the examination process. These proposals come in several types. One
type is designed to provide application-specific information in each examination,
for instance by requiring applicants to submit the results of commercial prior-art
searches.125 Another type is designed to solicit information from third parties
about prior art, for instance by crowdsourcing prior-art searches or by facilitating
post-grant review of granted patents.126 A third type of proposals is designed
to make it easier for examiners to find information on their own, for instance
by developing better databases of prior art.127
All of these reforms could undoubtedly help improve the substantive
screen, though just how much progress can be made is unclear. There are reasons
124 See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1510-11, 1511 n.65 (claiming that expending
resources to improve the examination process would prove inefficient because the vast majority of
patents are either not practiced or are of little commercial significance).
125 See Marc S. Adler, Defining the Invention: Searching Before Filing, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS
ASS’N (July 26, 2006), http://ipoa.typepad.com/presidents_column/2006/07/defining_the_in.html
[https://perma.cc/65VZ-JDBF] (“Attempting to define an invention in the absence of a thorough
prior art search is akin to throwing darts at a target blindfolded.”). Both Congress and the PTO
have also considered this approach. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., § 123
(2007) (introducing a patent reform bill which provides in part that “[t]he [PTO] Director shall, by
regulation, require that applicants submit a search report and other information and analysis relevant
to patentability”); Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Issues Related to the
Identification of Prior Art During the Examination of a Patent Application, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,803,
28,805 (May 27, 1999) (seeking public comment on the questions, “Should applicants be required to
conduct a prior art search and submit corresponding search results, including where they searched,
to the USPTO when filing a patent application? If not, should applicants be required to disclose
whether or not a search was conducted?”).
126 The PTO is trying both approaches. The AIA created a new system of post-grant review
under which third parties may petition the PTO to cancel previously issued patents. See generally 35
U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012). Under a different provision in the AIA, the PTO must accept from “[a]ny
person at any time” a citation to “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that
person believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent.” Id. § 301(a)(1);
see also id. § 122(e). Acting under this provision, third parties have partnered with the PTO to form
crowdsourced projects to find and submit invalidating prior art. See, e.g., Joel Spolsky, AskPatents.com:
A Stack Exchange to Prevent Bad Patents, STACK OVERFLOW (Sept. 20, 2012), http://blog.stackoverflow.
com/2012/09/askpatents-com-a-stack-exchange-to-prevent-bad-patents [https://perma.cc/36A9-QKL9]
(announcing the launch of a Stack Exchange site that enables users to submit anticipatory prior art); see
also Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Event on the Use of Crowdsourcing and ThirdParty Preissuance Submissions to Identify Relevant Prior Art, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,319, 15,320 (Mar. 19, 2014).
127 See, e.g., Request for Comments Regarding Prior Art Resources for Use in the Examination
of Software-Related Patent Applications, 79 Fed. Reg. 644, 645 (Jan. 6, 2014) (requesting comments
on what databases stakeholders find helpful in identifying software prior art and, more broadly, how
the PTO should “formulate and implement search strategies to identify” software prior art); Daniel
Nazer, Why Is the Patent Office So Bad at Reviewing Software Patents?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.:
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/why-patent-office-so-badreviewing-software-patents [https://perma.cc/9VV5-UMNU] (proposing that the PTO develop
“searchable databases of existing software programs” to help patent examiners find software prior art).
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to think that patent examination will always have a certain baseline error rate,
even aside from the errors expected in any system with the scale of the patent
system. By its very nature, the patent system handles cutting-edge technologies
in a wide variety of fields, making it harder to tell ex ante whether something is
truly new. Prioritizing especially important applications might help, since it would
reduce the scope of the problem and let examiners focus on getting the key decisions
right.128 But because patents are obtained early in the development cycles of
new technologies, it is often hard to tell whether an invention will become important.
2. Fixing the Costly Screen
Unlike the substantive screen, the costly screen is easy to fix. Since the
major flaw in the costly screen is that the cost of applying for a low-quality
patent is often less than the benefit of doing so, the obvious fix is just to increase
the cost. This could be done in several ways: by imposing higher application,
issuance, or maintenance fees, or by imposing other costs, like requiring
applicants to submit detailed validity charts or the results of commercial
prior-art searches.
Indeed, a strong case can be made that PTO fees should be substantially
higher than they are now. The basic filing fee for a utility patent varies from
$70 to $280, depending on the size of the filer, with search and examination fees
adding another $330 to $1320; the issuance fee is $240 to $960; and maintenance
fees (which are due 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years into the 20-year patent term) vary
from $400 to $7400.129 If the nuisance value of a patent is $150,000,130 then
these fees will not have a significant deterrent effect. A fee schedule approaching
$10,000 at issuance, $100,000 after 5 years, $1 million after 10 years, and $10 million
after 15 years would more effectively deter applicants from seeking low-value
(and thus low-quality) patents. And the effect on nonnuisance patents would be
relatively insignificant, since low-quality patent suits are disproportionately
brought near the end of a patent’s life.131
128 See Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?,
REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 10, 12-13 (proposing that applicants could pay for a more
detailed patent examination and obtain a “gold-plate[d]” patent).
129 PTO, FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 67.
130 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
131 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction
Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1331 (2013) (finding that nonpracticing
entities assert their patents relatively late in their term, while product-producing entities tend to
enforce their patents soon after issuance). Similarly, although the cost of obtaining a patent would
still be lower than the nuisance value of a patent under the current system, that value varies over
time. If most of the nuisance value of a patent can only be captured toward the end of a patent
term—once, for example, the industry has matured and the number of potential defendants is larger—
then large maintenance fees may deter applicants from seeking low-value patents even if the front-end
fees are small.
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There are limits, of course, to how costly patent fees should be. Because
patents are granted early in the development cycle to give inventors time to
commercialize their inventions, fees should escalate over a patent’s term.132
And if fees are too high, inventors will rely on trade secrecy or increase their
relative investments in nonpatentable innovations, which could deprive society
of new inventions and their public disclosures. Still, the most valuable inventions
(which are protected by the most valuable patents) are the ones least likely to
be affected by dramatically higher PTO fees. Since these are the inventions
society has the greatest interest in encouraging, substantially higher PTO fees
could have limited downsides.
C. Fixing the Cycle
Other reforms could disrupt the feedback loop that results from flaws in the
costly and substantive screens. While these reforms do not target examination
directly, they could nevertheless significantly temper the vicious cycle.
1. Reducing the Effect of the Flawed Substantive Screen
One set of reforms would reduce the effects of flaws in the substantive
screen. (These reforms would work to eliminate the top arrow in Figure 1.)
Flaws in the substantive screen feed into the vicious cycle by increasing the
expected value of applying for a low-quality patent. Reforms that reduce the
value of a low-quality patent, then, would discourage applicants from applying
for such patents, reducing the effect of the flawed substantive screen. Several
possible reforms fall into this category, though they all amount to changing
the patent holder’s cost–benefit analysis in bringing an infringement suit
asserting a low-quality patent.
One class of reforms would increase the cost of bringing an infringement
suit based on a low-quality patent. For instance, heightened pleading
requirements for patent cases—such as requiring patent holders to include
detailed infringement allegations or claim charts in complaints, or imposing
a higher filing fee for patent suits—would impose an ex ante cost on a patent
holder seeking to bring a nuisance case. Likewise, a fee-shifting rule in patent
cases would impose ex post costs on unsuccessful patent plaintiffs. All of these
proposals would reduce the expected value of a nuisance patent suit and thus
reduce the expected value of a low-quality patent.
Another class of reforms would reduce the benefit of bringing an
infringement suit based on a low-quality patent. Since that benefit is driven by
132 The patent system largely does this now. For a standard large entity, the application fee is
$280; the issuance fee is $960; and maintenance fees are, in order, $1600, $3600, and $7400. PTO,
FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 67.
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nuisance-settlement value, which is, in turn, driven by the costs of patent
litigation for defendants, these reforms would aim to reduce those costs. For
instance, rules limiting discovery in patent cases would cut down on one of the
most expensive parts of patent litigation (and an expense borne disproportionately
by defendants).133 Likewise, a bifurcation rule requiring courts to decide
validity before moving on to an infringement phase of a case would, in many
cases, allow defendants to avoid expensive discovery and would give defendants
additional leverage in settlement negotiations.134 These proposals would reduce
the expected benefit of bringing a patent lawsuit with a low-quality patent, and
thus reduce the incentive to apply for such patents.
A third class of reforms would change the likelihood of success on the
merits, affecting the expected value of bringing a patent lawsuit. For instance,
eliminating the heightened burden of proof that applies to invalidity defenses
would make it easier for defendants to prevail, reducing the value of a low-quality
patent.135 Similarly, broadening the standard for obviousness would reduce the
value of a low-quality patent. Notably, these reforms would only affect patents
with borderline validity; high-quality patents would be largely unaffected.
Many of these reforms are usually considered litigation measures, not reforms
to patent examination. Yet a critical implication of the vicious-cycle theory is
that they will also have a salutary effect on patent examination. By reducing
the incentive to apply for low-quality patents, these reforms would reduce the
PTO’s workload, making it easier to devote resources to higher-quality patent
applications. Likewise, they would improve the quality of the application pool,
reducing the number of potential low-quality patents in the first place.
Some of these reforms may become law in the coming years. For instance,
the Innovation Act, which passed the House of Representatives in 2013 by a vote

133 Many patent plaintiffs, and especially patent plaintiffs bringing nuisance cases, are small
entities without many discoverable business records. Defendants, on the other hand, are necessarily
entities that make, use, or sell an allegedly patented technology, and often have voluminous records
relating to that technology. Under current law, such records are almost always discoverable in an
infringement suit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case . . . .”); Reilly, supra note 82, at 196-99 (“Because patent defendants tend to possess ‘the
bulk of the relevant evidence,’ they have higher discovery costs than the patent holder. . . . Patent
assertion entities normally are small operations focused just on licensing and litigation that have few
relevant witnesses, documents, or other evidence.”); Letter from Sixty-One Professors to Congress
in Support of Patent Reform Legislation 1 (Nov. 25, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359621 [https://
perma.cc/7NEN-LMUR] (“[T]he bulk of . . . expenses [defending against a patent suit] are incurred
during the discovery phase of the litigation . . . .”).
134 See Ford, supra note 10, at 119-22 (concluding that bifurcating discussion of invalidity and
infringement in patent cases would reduce the pressure on defendants to settle cases early by reducing
the costs of discovery and providing parties with more information about the strength of lawsuits).
135 This would change pd in the model discussed supra Section II.A.
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of 325 to 91,136 would implement several of these reforms, including heightened
pleading requirements, discovery limitations, and presumptive fee shifting in
patent cases.137 Though the bill did not pass the Senate in 2013, it has been
reintroduced in the 114th Congress and stands a reasonable chance of passage.138
2. Reducing the Effect of the Flawed Costly Screen
Another set of reforms would work to reduce the effects of flaws in the
costly screen. (These reforms would work to eliminate the bottom arrow in
Figure 1.) Flaws in the costly screen propagate throughout the system because
they increase the number of patent applications, causing the PTO to expand
more quickly than it can while maintaining the quality of examination. These
reforms, then, work to increase the scalability of the PTO.
One set of reforms would give patent examiners better tools, which, as
discussed above, would help them find better prior art.139 Besides improving the
substantive screen, this would also help reduce the effect of the flawed costly
screen because it would help make up for any reductions in the quality of the
examiner pool and would help reduce training and startup costs when the
PTO hires new examiners. For instance, new databases of prior art and new
crowdsourcing platforms would help a larger examiner pool examine more patent
applications without sacrificing quality.
A strategy that may be more scalable would be to find ways to expand the
size of the PTO without sacrificing quality, usually by finding new pools of
potential examiners. The PTO has made moves in this area that may prove to be
quite valuable, both by permitting many examiners to work from home and by
opening new satellite offices in Dallas, Denver, Detroit, and San Jose.140 These
programs have improved examiner retention and opened up new pools of potential
examiners who would not be willing or able to work in Alexandria, Virginia.141
Although these programs do not eliminate the scaling problem presented by
coordination and research costs, they could eliminate or substantially reduce the
problems presented by personnel costs and declining examination quality.

136 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 629, OFF. CLERK: HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 5. 2013,
1:12 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll629.xml [https://perma.cc/9GX7-9E2E].
137 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).
138 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
139 See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
140 See PTO, 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 51, 52 fig.29 (describing the
PTO’s telework program).
141 Telework and satellite offices also bring numerous new examiners into the PTO, which may
itself be good for patent quality. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 45 (finding that, upon promotion
to jobs limiting the time available for examination, patent examiners become more likely to grant
invalid patents).
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All of these reforms would have particular direct effects, but they would
also help improve the patent-examination system as a whole by reducing the
feedback effects that lead to the vicious cycle.
CONCLUSION
Although patent examination aims to protect the quality of the patent
system by screening out low-quality and low-value patents, there is a growing
consensus that it does an imperfect job at best. While some examination errors
are probably inevitable, this Article suggests that patent examination may be
trapped in a vicious cycle in which the quality of examination progressively
worsens, as more applicants seek low-quality patents and the patent system
struggles to keep pace. Such a cycle is especially troubling since nuisance
patents are playing an increasingly large role in the patent system.
Yet the same feedback effects that lead to the vicious cycle in the first
place also make it easier to solve, since the effects of a reform would propagate
throughout the cycle. This gives policymakers the ability to focus on the easiest
places to make reforms (like limiting discovery in patent cases or imposing
larger fees on patent recipients) instead of trying to do the impossible (like
making examiners substantively better at their jobs).

